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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	FORM SYMBOL AND NO.
TO	Chief, SE	SECRET	ECMA-40877
INFO	Chief, SR, JCS/J, COB, Frankfurt		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-1-6
FROM	Chief, Munich Base		DATE 5 March 1959
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/LOIMPROVE/EQUAL/UJDRIZZLY/CARETINA/OPERATIONAL Plan for CARETINA; Relationship with UPSWING		RE: "43.3" -- (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	Please inform Munich Base whether CARETINA is part of the 200-1-6 File; if not, what the correct		
REFERENCE(S)	Headquarters File No. is, and whether the EE or SR Division should be the addressee for action.		
<p>A. ESFA-24731; 31 December 1958</p> <p>B. MUNI-2606</p> <p>1. Reference A inquired as to Munich Base's plans for CARETINA, information which should have been forthcoming long before reference B was dispatched. The primary obstacles encountered in drafting and executing a plan for exploitation of CARETINA were a) UPSWING, and b) the very considerable research and file organization to be done in order to prepare the MB case officer who would attempt the debriefing. As headquarters is aware, in order to talk with CARETINA to any advantage the KUBARK case officer must know the EQUAL files well; must know the World War II German security organization which investigated the Soviet net entitled "Rote Kapelle" and of which CARETINA was a member in his capacity of head of the "Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle"; should have some background in the UJDRIZZLY File and UPSWING's rather diffuse and alleged investigations of "Rote Kapelle" survivors. The basic file organization has been accomplished and I has read into the Munich EQUAL File and the CARETINA file. UPSWING's written and UTILITY's oral approval for direct contact between CARETINA and KUBARK was received on 16 February 1959. For the sake of the record we have attempted to review the UPSWING/CARETINA relationship as known to us, pointing out the unanswered questions and puzzles.</p> <p>A. UPSWING Officers in Contact with CARETINA.</p> <p>2. Upon his arrival in the Federal Republic, circa January 1956, CARETINA immediately sought out former NSIA colleagues and others who had worked with him in the "Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle". His first contact with UPSWING was GREGER, CARETINA's deputy in the Sonderkommando during late 1942 and early 1943. At the same time he sought out his former colleagues in CAVATA. UPSWING apparently assigned BRISCHKE, a former Abwehr Lieutenant Colonel who was in Abwehr III F, Brussels and who assisted the Sonderkommando in the investigations of the "Rote Kapelle", to act as contact with CARETINA. Thus, the two men in UPSWING having direct contact with CARETINA had been under his command when CARETINA headed the Sonderkommando. Presumably CARETINA also contacted ALBERTI, UPSWING's "RIS expert", who was a former acquaintance of CARETINA and a former NSIA member in Amts VI and VII (see PULL 4562, 15 June 1956 and reported in a Memorandum for the Record of June 1956 on a conversation between [redacted] and BRISCHKE). As of 21 August 1956 BRISCHKE stated to [redacted] that he, BRISCHKE, was "out of the picture" and OTTO was dealing with CARETINA on an anonymous basis. In February 1959 it was learned that OTTO was still in the UPSWING headquarters, having been previously reported as being posted to a foreign post. We do not know whether OTTO has continued contact with CARETINA until the date of writing. A memorandum, dated January 1958, found in the Munich CARETINA file contains the information that when OTTO was scheduled to leave for his foreign post (which he apparently did not take), UPSWING had planned to drop contact with CARETINA due to the latter's failure to "produce". Inasmuch as OTTO did not leave UPSWING headquarters as he had stated he was doing and has recently been discovered to have been in Munich since his alleged date of departure, we wonder whether the contact with CARETINA was actually dropped.</p>			
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B. UPSWING's Attitude Toward CARETINA.

3. In July 1956 GRISSEN stated more or less flatly that CARETINA was controlled by the Soviet intelligence service and had a mission in West Germany (see KONN 1368, 19 July 1956, and ECLA 20026, 20 July 1956). GRISCHKE stated in August 1956 that he was convinced that CARETINA had an "SIS" mission (see PULL 5173, 14 August 1956). Thus, based on opinions expressed by UPSWING officers, CARETINA was regarded by UPSWING as a Soviet agent. UPSWING also made vague references to the old world war II mystery of whether or not Gruppenfuehrer und General Major der Polizei MUELLER, head of Amt IV of the NSDA, was a Soviet agent. As is known, CARETINA worked directly under MUELLER as head of the St. Borkommando Rote Kapelle. At that time we had to assume that UPSWING would take some action to substantiate or disprove their own suspicions.

C. UPSWING's Actions.

4. [ ] debriefed CARETINA for NOBACH on 31 July, 1 and 3 August 1956. CARETINA notified [ ] that he was ill during 4 and 5 August and then on 6 August, he informed [ ] that he had been employed by a "German Service" with a salary of 1500 DM per month. According to CARETINA his "German Service" had instructed him that he could talk to the Americans about his experience in the USSR but could touch on no other period of his career. GRISCHKE was queried on 12 August 1956 and stated that he personally had interviewed and employed CARETINA for UPSWING (see FRAN 1422, 8 August 1956, and PULL 5173, 14 August 1956). Whether CARETINA informed GRISCHKE that he was being debriefed by the AIS during the period 31 July through 3 August or whether UPSWING discovered this through another channel, we do not know. We would hazard a guess that CARETINA phoned GRISCHKE and told him in order to force UPSWING to employ him, probably hoping at the same time that this would give him bargaining power with the AIS for a more permanent and lucrative arrangement. In the same conversation during which GRISCHKE stated that UPSWING had employed CARETINA, he added that UPSWING firmly believed CARETINA to have a mission for Soviet intelligence in the Federal Republic.

5. During the same interview of 13 August 1956, GRISCHKE told [ ] that CARETINA had attempted to get some type of "certificate" from SAVATA and had failed. [ ] deduced that GRISCHKE had provided the "certificate". [ ] reported in Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Conversation with GRISCHKE, 13 August 1956, "while GRISCHKE did not say what the certificate was about, the context was such that it might well be something needed in connection with (CARETINA's) denazification, legalization or right to a pension". In October 1956 [ ] reported a conversation with Mr. BENJAMIN of CIC during which BENJAMIN stated that it was a rather disturbing fact that UPSWING had provided the necessary certificate for CARETINA in view of the general suspicions.

6. On the basis of the "certificate" provided by UPSWING, CARETINA is now fully reinstated in the Federal Republic. He told [ ] in February 1958 (see ECFA 20300, 6 February 1958) that "he, CARETINA, has now, as he puts it, achieved 95% of what he has been fighting for for the past two years to gain official recognition of his permanent civil service tenure and the rights associated with it". Again in April 1958 [ ] reported (ECFA 21301, 14 April 1958), CARETINA now has a pension of ca. 750 DM per month; he has a Civil Service status of "Kriminalrat zur Wiederverwendung" and is in theory awaiting an assignment to a suitable vacancy receiving the equivalent of his pension. His wartime promotion to the rank of Kriminalrat is recognized. His service subsequent to his transfer to the SAVATA (Amt IV of the NSDA) including his eleven years in Soviet prisons and concentration camps counts toward his retirement. Reviewing what we know of the events (as listed above), it seems fairly definite that UPSWING is responsible for CARETINA having legalized himself in West Germany with the status of a civil servant, while

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holding the suspicion that CARETINA was a Soviet agent. One other remark by @RISCHKE which points to support is that CARETINA is technically a deserter, having voluntarily joined the Red Army with his double agent KENT. @RISCHKE was more evasive about the fact that UPSWING did not bring up the deserter charge in talking with CARETINA (see FILE 5173, 11 August 1956).

D. Conclusion.

7. Reviewing the above, the apparent contradictions are obvious. We have attempted to understand @PSWING's handling and attitude toward CARETINA in order to prepare ourselves for our own approach to CARETINA. Following are some of our theories:

a. If UPSWING believed CARETINA to have been sent back to the Federal Republic on a Soviet intelligence mission, why did the organization assist him in regaining full rights as a German civil servant thus sacrificing any control or pressure the organization could have exerted in blocking his legalization? It is probable that UPSWING felt that in dealing with a former German official of CARETINA's rank more was to be gained by being friendly and cooperative than by a hostile attitude. This attitude would appear to have failed if @OTTO's remarks in January 1957 are true, i.e., CARETINA is a "hard nut to crack", and based on the fact that UPSWING is now willing that KUBARK talk to CARETINA, with no caveats placed on the discussions.

b. If UPSWING received the material photographed by [ ] from CARETINA's briefcase, what action has been taken on the basis of some of the leads and information? If no action has been taken, why not? UPSWING has never notified KUBARK that any information was received from CARETINA. Consequently we cannot ask direct questions and are completely in the dark as to what investigations or operational action has been taken. There is a possibility that information developed through CARETINA's leads was embarrassing to UPSWING, but if this is true why is UPSWING willing for us to have direct, unlimited access to CARETINA? Or has UPSWING placed restrictions on CARETINA when talking to the Americans of which we are unaware? These questions can only be answered by a) talking to CARETINA b) probing further with UPSWING.

c. In view of UPSWING's alleged interest in the UJDRIZZLY complex, styled by UPSWING as an outgrowth of "Rote Kapelle" survivors, was CARETINA interrogated on members of the UJDRIZZLY complex? UPSWING has given KUBARK no evidence that such an interrogation occurred or that CARETINA provided any background information on members of the UJDRIZZLY group. Answers to this question will also have to await direct contact with CARETINA and further probing with UPSWING.

8. One factor which has to be considered in reviewing the UPSWING/CARETINA relationship is CARETINA himself. As far as we can deduce from UPSWING's few comments and [ ] reporting, CARETINA is not a passive personality. He took full advantage of the German respect for rank in making his approach to UPSWING by doing it through a former subordinate, @REGER. @RISCHKE, although not an RSHA member during World War II, did come under the command of the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle during his service with the Abwehr in Brussels. CARETINA probably took advantage of this former relationship. @OTTO who had no World War II connection with CARETINA and who dealt with him "anonymously" appears to have had little success in interrogating or breaking CARETINA. From this we deduce that CARETINA probably set the tone of his relationship with UPSWING and when he discovered that he was not going to be employed as a ranking staff member, he refused to cooperate in any way.

9. In conclusion we can only repeat our question of why did UPSWING permit CARETINA to become uncontrollable? Was or is UPSWING afraid of antagonizing him? of forcing him to report fully and completely? As to the reason UPSWING has not passed any CARETINA reports (if received) to

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KURARK, one possible answer is that UPSWING has not been prodded very persistently to pass the reports promised in August of 1956. Another answer, as mentioned above, is that some of CARETINA's information may be embarrassing to UPSWING.

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